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Abstract: This case analysis examines several court decisions, including the 
results of three New York Court of Appeals cases where litigants challenged the 
constitutionality of municipal land use decisions.  In each case, the court afforded 
the municipality deference and found that their objectives were rationally related 
to the decisions, mostly decisions to deny development.  However, this 
presumption of validity given to local legislatures and quasi-judicial agencies 
presents a problem when land use decisions affect outside municipalities.  
Thankfully, through the use of training programs, municipalities are learning to 




Examined from the perspective of local land use officials, state law has them in a 
bind.  Faced with urban decay in one community, rampant sprawl in another, and 
a depressed economy in a third, they feel ill equipped, legally, to redirect the 
market forces to accomplish their community development objectives.  At the 
Land Use Law Center at Pace Law School, we have now trained over 600 local 
land use leaders from all types of communities in the Hudson River Valley and 
have heard this complaint from all too many all of them.   
 
To be specific, they say, local governments have too few strategic tools to use, 
must allow all privately owned land to be developed, and have no ability to 
protect themselves from the external impacts of land use projects approved in 
adjacent communities.  Further, they fear that if take bold steps to direct 
development to occur in certain places and prevent it in others, they will lose 
when landowners take them to court. This column deals primarily with this latter 
fear, then turns to the other assumptions that limit local officials’ thinking about 
their ability to achieve their community’s land use objectives. It concludes that 
most of these fears are false and that new paradigms are available to shape a 
more positive local response to land use challenges.  
 
Last year, a trilogy of Court of Appeals decisions, all decided on July first, should 
put to rest any concerns about the attitude of the courts toward fact-based local 
land use decisions. The first case, Matter of Retail Property Trust v Board of 
Zoning Appeals of Town of Hempstead, 98 N.Y.2d 190 (2002), involves the 
denial of a special use permit sought by a regional mall for its expansion to 
accommodate a new department store. The ZBA denied the permit concluding 
that the proposed expansion would adversely impact traffic and air quality.  The 
ZBA based its determination on facts presented to it by the project’s opponents 
regarding the air pollution and traffic to be caused by other projects approved, 
but not yet built, in the vicinity of the mall. In overruling the Appellate Division 
reversal of the zoning board’s determination, the Court of Appeals held that the 
ZBA's decision was based on substantial evidence and was rational.  Although 
the mall owner presented credible evidence to support its proposed expansion of 
the mall, the Court of Appeals reasoned that deference must be given to the ZBA 
when the record contains other substantial grounds on which to base a denial.   
 
Several aspects of this case counter local fears that courts are hostile to their 
efforts to control development. First, the source of the reports relied on – the 
project’s opponents – was not important to the court’s determination.  As long as 
the reports are factual and contain substantial evidence supporting the board’s 
decision, they are sufficient to justify that decision.  Second, the court’s role is not 
to weigh or balance the evidence presented in support of both sides, but simply 
to determine whether there was substantial evidence on the record that supports 
the board’s decision. In other words the court may not substitute its judgment of 
the facts and their weight for that of the local administrative review board.  Third, 
the Court of Appeals noted specifically that local review boards in these 
circumstances are entitled to judicial deference.  
 
In Ifrah v. Utschig, 98 N.Y. 2d 304 (2002), a landowner challenged the denial of a 
request for four area variances by the Town of Harrison’s zoning board of 
appeals. The variances requested would have allowed the landowner to 
subdivide an already nonconforming lot and allow him to build a second home on 
the land.  The result would have been to create two lots - each including less 
than a half acre in an area zoned for single-family housing on lots of at least one 
acre in size. Again, the neighbors complained and put facts on the record about 
the impact on the neighborhood of the extra home and the traffic it would 
generate. The Appellate Division was impressed by the fact that most of the 
homes in the neighborhood were built on substandard size lots and that more 
than half of them were on lots even smaller than those proposed by the 
landowner in his variance request. From this, the Appellate Division concluded 
that granting the variance would not have an adverse effect on the neighborhood 
and thus the town zoning board’s decision was not supported by substantial 
evidence.  
 
The Court of Appeals reversed and upheld the denial of the variances by the 
zoning board.  Essentially, it held that the Appellate Division erroneously 
performed the role of the local land use board by deciding which facts on the 
record should be used to decide the matter.  Under state law, area variance 
decisions are to be made by local zoning boards after balancing a number of 
considerations.  The Court of Appeals noted that the neighbors, in addition to 
simply voicing their opposition to the variances, placed facts on the record about 
the adverse effect of the proposed modern home the neighborhood. They 
documented the impact of contemporary design on the neo-Tudor architectural 
style of the houses on the street, the interruption of the uniform spacing between 
the existing homes that gave them the appearance of being on larger lots, and 
the confluence of several existing driveways on the portion of the street affected 
by the driveway of the proposed new home.  These are facts.  Although they 
were placed on the record by the opponents, they do not reflect the unvarnished 
opposition of the neighbors but rather the facts behind that opposition.  Based on 
these facts, the Court of Appeals found that the zoning board “could rationally 
conclude that the detriment of the proposed subdivision posed to the 
neighborhood outweighed the benefit sought by the landowner, and its 
determination denying the requested variances was not arbitrary or capricious.” 
 
In the third case, P.M.S. Assets, Ltd. v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Village of 
Pleasantville, 98 N.Y. 2d 683 (2002), the Court of Appeals again overruled an 
Appellate Division decision that reversed a zoning board determination.  In this 
case, neighbors in a residentially zoned part of the village complained that the 
new owner of a lot which contained a nonconforming industrial building had 
changed  its use in violation of the local zoning law.  The village zoning board 
determined that converting the use of a warehouse from storing customers’ 
goods to housing the new business’s equipment, inventory, and supplies was a 
qualitative change in the nonconforming use of the type prohibited by local 
zoning. Although both the Supreme Court and the Appellate Division reversed 
the board, the Court of Appeals found that the board could rationally have arrived 
at its decision and that its decision should not be disturbed by the judiciary.  
 
In these three cases, the Court of Appeals affirmed decisions made by local land 
use boards acting in three different capacities: a review board determining 
whether to approve a request for a special use permit (Retail Property Trust); an 
appellate body balancing various factors to determine whether to award an area 
variance (Ifrah); and an appellate body interpreting the zoning code and whether 
it is violated by a change in land use (P.M.S. Assets).  In all three capacities, the 
local board was sustained, the intermediate courts told not to substitute their 
judgments for that of the local board, and the existence of facts on the record 
was found sufficient to uphold local board decisions under the substantial 
evidence rule.  
 
If the highest court affords these quasi-judicial and administrative review boards 
such deference, imagine what it does when the local land use decision 
challenged is made by the local legislature: the town board, village board of 
trustees, or city council.  In Asian Americans for Equality v. Koch, 72 N.Y. 2d 
121, the petitioners challenged a New York City zoning amendment that provided 
greater zoning incentives for education facilities than it did for low income 
housing. The Court of Appeals held that the challengers had not carried their 
burden of proving that the bonus provision was clearly arbitrary or capricious or 
undertaken for an improper purpose.  See also Kraveth v. Plenge, 446 N.Y.S.2d 
807 (4th Dept. 1982), one of a long line of cases holding that when local 
legislatures enact zoning amendments there is a “strong presumption of validity” 
and that the challenger must demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the 
amendment “beyond a reasonable doubt.”  In Tilles Investment Company v. 
Huntington, 528 NYS2d 386 (2nd Dept 1988), the court held that  “the Town was 
not required to explore or utilize alternative measures which would place less 
restrictions on the possible uses to which plaintiff’s property might be put.” To act 
otherwise would put the court in the position of second guessing the discretionary 
judgments of the local legislature. This is anathema to judges and illustrates why 
they cloak local regulations with a presumption of validity.   
 
The Retail Property Trust case, supra, assuages the local fear that adjacent 
communities can not influence their neighbor’s land use decisions that might 
adversely affect them.  In this case, the Village of Garden City introduced its own 
expert report into the record of the zoning board of the Town of Hempstead 
showing that the additional traffic caused by the proposed expansion of the mall 
would cause drivers to shift to less congested secondary roads running through 
the village. The existence of this report on the record influenced the Court of 
Appeals decision that the local zoning board’s decision was supported by 
substantial evidence.  Since 1992, local governments have been encouraged by 
state statute to cooperate in comprehensive planning, land use regulation, and 
zoning enforcement. These state statutes make it clear that local governments 
have the authority to create intermunicipal planning boards, zoning boards of 
appeals, comprehensive plans, land use regulations, intermunicipal overlay 
districts, and programs for shared land use administration and enforcement. N.Y. 
GEN. CITY LAW § 20-g (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1996), N.Y. TOWN LAW § 284 
(McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1996) and N.Y. VILLAGE LAW §7-741 (McKinney 1996).  
Increasingly local governments have taken advantage of this authority to 
coordinate their regulatory influence on shared environmental resources, 
transportation corridors, and economic development.  In the Hudson River 
Valley, the leaders we have trained are participating in nine such inter-local land 
use councils and have formed a consortium of those councils at the regional 
level. By their actions, these local leaders are putting to rest the fears of others 
concerned that localities have no effective means of influencing the land use 
actions of their neighbors. 
 
Local land use officials in our training programs are surprised to learn that the 
Court of Appeals empowered them over 50 years ago to invent their own land 
use tools and techniques which will be upheld as long as their objective is to 
achieve the most appropriate use of the land.  In reliance on this implied 
authority, communities have invented incentive zoning, planned unit development 
districts, traditional neighborhood development districts, recreational zoning, and 
floating zones, which was the technique attacked as beyond local zoning 
authority in Rodgers. v. Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115 (1951).  The Court of Appeals, 
in defending the village’s authority, noted “In view, however, of Tarrytown’s 
changing scene and the other substantial reasons for the board’s decision, we 
cannot say that its action was arbitrary or illegal.  While hardships may be 
imposed on this or that owner, cardinal is the principle that what is best for the 
body politic in the long run must prevail over the interests of particular 
individuals.”  Earlier in the decision it wrote “persons who own property in a 
particular zone or use district enjoy no eternally vested right to that classification 
if the public interest demands otherwise.”   
 
 
 
